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DOES THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN FUTURE EU-US RELATIONS? Introduction
As the European Union (EU) gathers momentum, an equitable and credible partner to the US will shortly exist with the potential to share the burden of today's global challenges.
However, despite the 'Solana Paper's' statement that this trans-Atlantic relationship is one of the core elements of the international system, with the numerous trade and foreign policy conflicts that exist between the two powers, the relationship has effectively floundered. 1 There is a growing sense in the US that the EU is becoming increasingly antagonistic towards the US and all it stands for. Peter van Ham of the International Herald Tribune has written that the US response to this resistance is that the EU is being treated by Americans with indifference at best; at worst is considered irrelevant; and will be increasingly marginalized in a world where the US intends to remain the unchallenged hegemon. 2 But can the US afford to ignore the EU at a time when, by any standards, the EU has made such remarkable and rapid progress towards a unified continent against a backdrop of centuries of conflict? The creation of the world's largest free trade area and the continued health of the euro would suggest that it cannot. Even if the US wanted to forge a closer relationship with the EU, is that possible under the climate of mistrust that has persisted since formation of the coalition to fight the war in Iraq in 2003? With polarized political views between unilateralism and lateralism at the core of the animosity, an intermediary is required to calm the Atlantic waters and foster an atmosphere of collective opportunity. In the past, this role has often fallen to the UK, and with the linguistic, cultural and historical ties between the UK and US, there is still no country better positioned to perform this function. However, while the UK remains the staunchest ally of the US and more willing than any other nation to confront the global terrorist menace head on, there are signs that even this 'special relationship' is under threat, further exemplifying the extent to which US unilateralism has tightened its grip.
In the quest to explore this seemingly unpromising situation, this paper will first examine the trans-Atlantic relationship from the EU perspective, and then through an American lens with a view to establishing why the US should change its current outlook. No attempt will be made to explore relational issues before the Balkans Crises of the 1990s. Thereafter, the 2006 Munich
Conference on Security Policy will be briefly evaluated in order to clarify the current state of affairs between the two powers.
This analysis will provide the background for the main section of the paper that will outline the UK's role in the EU-US relationship, primarily with the US, but also as a member of the EU, dating back to the 1970s. This section will explore whether successful political relationships by British leaders have translated into actual influence and at what cost. Then an assessment will be made of how the UK can continue to influence the other two powers, to what effect, or indeed whether it is in its continued interest to do so. Of course, success will also depend on how receptive these powers are to advice (there are many in the US who believe that the less the US has to do with Europe, the better, and that a policy of 'cherry-picking' an ally will offer the path of least resistance). 3 With analysis of recent history showing that trans-Atlantic loyalties often go no deeper than the length of a government or a US administration, permanency in this area can be a fickle notion.
The European Union Perspective of the EU-US Relationship
Under the most recent round of expansions in May 2004, membership of the EU ballooned from 15 to 25 countries, with more destined to follow over the next few years. 4 With the increasing labor force and reductions in trade barriers between the member nations, it is likely that the EU will remain a major player on the global economic and political stage. The
Union has come a long way since its inept response towards Bosnia and Serbia during the 1990s, not just in terms of military cohesion, but across all other instruments of power (IOPs). The introduction of the euro has also contributed significantly to this development, with countries around the world starting to look towards it as the international currency rather than thinking only in US dollars.
But while some (mainly in the US) consider the Union to be too diverse to be effective, it is, in fact, this very diversity that generates the Union's greatest source of strength, its stability.
Where the US appears content to further its National Security Strategy through unilateral action, over a thousand years of conflict, most notably in the twentieth century, has resulted in an EU that strives to achieve its aims though consensus, dialogue, and a natural bias towards the 'softer' instruments of power. 5 Although the diversity of European Union has, in the past, caused procrastination and unacceptable delays in dealing with a crisis, such as the decision to commit ground troops to the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, this bias is popular in a world that is suspicious of US foreign policy and the overwhelming strength of its military. As such, there is a willingness to cooperate with the Union, thereby enhancing its informational and diplomatic power.
This is not to say that uniting diversity has come without its problems. implied that such institutions are less relevant, particularly to a hegemonic superpower that believes it already occupies the moral high ground.
Finally, when considering the impact that the European Security Strategy will have on trans-Atlantic relations, it must be remembered that in the short term, the EU is bound to remain distracted by internal issues as its scheduled expansion continues. Also, the challenges that an EU-integrated Turkey will pose to the EU will be significant, with nervousness surrounding 
Why the US Perspective of the EU-US Relationship Must Change
According to Ronald Asmus of the German Marshall Fund, there are four main reasons why the US should lend its full support to the further integration of the EU: to promote peace and stability in Europe; to enable the US and EU to tackle together the global challenges of the twenty-first century; because a natural coalition of the two powers will be of a magnitude sufficient to set a truly global agenda and coalesce world opinion around a common view; and because the EU is a magnet with influence beyond its borders helping to stabilize the fragile democracies on the continent's periphery. 12 So if these seemingly enticing advantages are not sufficient to persuade the US that the EU is worth investing in (i.e. influencing), one can surmise that either the US believes that such claims are founded on an unrealistic portrayal of EU capability, that the EU is simply not high enough on the US agenda to warrant special attention, or that the advantages of a stronger EU are counterproductive to US interests; these issues are explored below.
As intimated earlier, the EU response to the Balkans crises during the 1990s left the US in no doubt as to the military incompetence of the Union regarding its capacity to react in a timely fashion and the capacity of its member nations to participate in alliance or coalition operations with the US. The EU response to these crises has had a long-lasting effect on the US in both political and military circles, with many considering that alliance and coalition operations are counterproductive, with a disproportionate amount of effort being spent on maintaining coalition unity rather than actually fighting the conflict. There are, however, four reasons why such perceptions must be overcome.
First, the EU is making slow but steady progress towards a Rapid Reaction Force that should number some 100,000 by the end of the decade. 13 While it is currently thought that this force will have the primary mission of conducting small-scale operations in the European area, as stipulated in the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks', 14 it should eventually have the capacity to relieve the burden on US forces, particularly in support of operations other than large-scale conflict. In pursuance of this aim, the US needs to fully support EU forces' evolution in order to maximize interoperability between forces throughout NATO, as well as in ad hoc coalitions of the willing;
the lack of interoperability of forces during the crisis in Kosovo had a significant impact on the overall effectiveness of the Alliance effort. Finally, by its very nature, unilateral action by the US will be perceived as hegemonic, overbearing and oppressive, often generating feelings of resentment, regardless of the morality of the cause. Consequently, creation of an alliance or coalition, particularly if endorsed by a UN mandate, should help to legitimize operations and reduce this effect. However, it should also be noted that coalition operations are not the panacea in gaining global acceptance of US foreign policy, for it will be difficult for the US to shake off the image of an overbearing superpower whenever it is the leading partner in a coalition.
Another problem demonstrated in the Balkans crises that will be more challenging to overcome, however, will be the multilateral political dimension of any future coalition involving EU forces, an aspect that can have considerable effect on the tempo of a campaign. During the Kosovo war, for instance, the process for target approval was exceedingly lengthy and complex, with any of the NATO allies having the right of veto. 18 Again, the disadvantages of this must be measured against the probability of attaining one's end state in unilateral operations and any secondary effects downstream. Creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force that exercises the full chain of command, including the political dimension, should go some way to mitigating this risk in the future. From the US perspective, the complexities of coalition operations at the political level must be anticipated from the outset of campaign planning, if pressures like those encountered during the Kosovo war are to be avoided.
When comparing the European Security Strategy to the US NSS, it appears that the European issue most pertinent to the US in the immediate future is the terrorist threat within the EU and its neighboring countries, particularly as terrorist attacks in the US can easily be coordinated from Europe. 19 Again the security strategies are closely aligned on this issue, with the Solana Paper placing terrorism first on the list of key threats and the US NSS stressing the need to 'strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism', a message pervasive throughout the strategy. 20 However, closer cooperation beyond that currently shared between the UK and US intelligence services will be required if such lofty sentiments are to become a reality. Despite the rhetoric, the US appears currently too preoccupied with combating terrorism in the Middle East to be distracted by matters of a lower priority in Europe.
Another matter that has recently influenced US sentiment towards the EU is the blossoming political relationship between the US and Russia. Initially concerned with the effects of NATO enlargement on the USSR after the fall of the Berlin Wall, since 9/11 the US has found common ground with its Cold War adversary, with both countries sharing indifferent views on the relevance of the EU; 21 the strength of this relationship has dramatically reduced US concern regarding former Warsaw-Pact countries trying to join the Alliance. From the US perspective, now of greater importance is the interoperability of these 'new' EU countries as they migrate towards NATO, and the impact that this will have on future Alliance operations.
Another area where the EU is of considerable interest to the US is trade. Scheffer, the Secretary General of NATO, little can be achieved without significant restructuring of the financial mechanisms of the organization, most notably due to the fact that funding for NATO operations is currently undertaken by the country whose forces are 'in-rotation' at the time. 27 The US and UK defense ministers, Donald Rumsfeld and John Reid, were more specific about the funding issues, emphasising the need to resource NATO forces adequately and fairly, with Rumsfeld taking a hard line on the requirement for European countries to commit more of their Gross Domestic Products to defense. Stating that the current levels of investment will not be sufficient to meet the challenges in the decades ahead, he was keen to illustrate the point by demonstrating the disproportional amounts that nineteen of the NATO countries contribute to their defense (notably less than two percent), in comparison to the 3.7 percent currently being spent by the US.
This statement was in stark contrast to that of Germany's new chancellor, Angela Merkel, who, while predicting that Germany would be "the leading EU group within ten years," prepared the audience for disappointment concerning Germany's defense spending. 28 She must have high hopes for the common European armaments industry to which she referred, if she believes that the technology gap between the EU and US can be narrowed, as she intimated, without substantial investment. However, if the Americans present were unimpressed with her claims, they may have been conciliated by the Chancellor's harder line on Iran, when she deemed that fear surrounding Iran's nuclear intentions beyond peaceful purposes was well justified. 'counterweight' argument to US strength on this occasion, it was evident that the AmericanFrench relationship, at least in public, still has some way to go. 32 The EU representatives would have been no less uninspired by Rumsfeld's speech.
While he did concede that "no nation can succeed in the War on Terror without close cooperation from other nations," not once did he mention the European defense force, or for that matter, even the EU. 33 Instead he chose to focus on the terrorist threat emanating from seemingly every corner of the globe and how, in order to deal with this threat, the opportunity to transform NATO must not be missed. On balance, this speech did little to bring the EU and US closer together, or convince the audience that the US really believes in Europe's military potential.
The UK-US 'Special Relationship'; Does Friendship Equate to Influence?
The previous sections of this paper have illustrated why the current relationship between the US and the EU has faltered, and why from the EU perspective, the US appears to be becoming increasingly unilateral in its approach to foreign affairs and national security, despite the rhetoric in the NSS. The 'special relationship' between the UK and the US has not suffered to the same extent, and for this reason, combined with its position within the EU, the UK remains uniquely positioned to elevate EU issues on the US agenda. But in order to assess whether the UK can be successful in this mission, first it is necessary to examine whether the UK's relationship with the US does, in fact, equate to influence over it, and assess why an EU-US relationship is of benefit to the UK in the first place. in Northern Ireland, and had an influence which many thought was above her station within the European Community, where she often found herself fighting in isolation and to great effect.
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In a world that realized that the two leaders were prepared to support each other over the broadest range of issues, she commanded an increased level of respect at home and abroad that certainly contributed to her election to three consecutive terms of office. This enabled her to Gold Medal. In this speech, he agreed that "[t]he mission determines the coalition," an assertion made by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld after the 9/11 attacks and in reaction to Kosovo, which paved the way for coalitions of the willing rather than a NATO operation in Afghanistan.
Thereafter, however, Blair was able to use the opportunity as a stage to promote multilateralism in preference to acting alone, and the need for America to "listen as well as lead." 42 He also raised issues not related to the war in Iraq, such as the importance of the Kyoto protocol, a subject that galvanises global opposition against US policy almost as much as the war itself.
Nonetheless, cognisant of his surroundings, he left the US Congress in no doubt of his position regarding 'counterweight' theories to US power, stating that " [t] here is no more dangerous theory in international politics than that we need to balance the power of America with other competitive powers: different poles around which nations gather." Secretary Jack Straw's intervention in the so-called 'Road-map' for Middle East peace. 44 Of less strategic significance, but nonetheless important to the British public, was Blair's ability to secure the release of four prisoners from the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in January 2005. 45 And finally, although Blair's support of the independent European defense capability initially angered many in the US, he was probably the only EU leader able to convince
Washington that the move should not be viewed as a threat to NATO or US interests, but as complementary.
But it is pointless to examine how the UK has benefited from this relationship without counting the cost. In Iraq, for instance, the size of the British contribution within MNF-I is only due to the fact that the UK was willing to share the risk with the US in 2003, by committing around 45,000 personnel to the war, which represented approximately the same commitment per capita as the US.
46 Similarly, at the political level, British prime ministers have been required to support the US through thick and thin, or at least avoid exposing it, such as when Prime Minister Thatcher elected to remain silent over the supply of US arms to Iran that were intended to secure the release of US hostages. She had knowledge of this activity a year prior to the 1986 economic summit in Tokyo when President Reagan backed an appeal to end arms exports to states sponsoring terrorism. 47 Naturally, issues such as this have confirmed the often-quoted opinion in the press (in the UK as well as mainland Europe) that the UK remains little more than the lap dog of the US, and that the UK will do whatever is required to please its master. Second, British willingness as a nation to shed the blood of its youth alongside those of the US has created a bond between the two countries that has an indefinable quality of its own. 53 This generates respect between the two nations at all levels and across all IOPs and has spun off a multitude of 'softer' mutual benefits, such as a willingness to generate trade. This 'brotherhood' has been strengthened by the fact that the US is feeling increasingly isolated in a world where opposition to the American 'way of war' is on the rise.
Lastly, and contrary to the previous two points, the UK should not be so naïve as to expect that the current UK/US relationship will guarantee an outcome to any situation or that favoritism from the US is a given. The US will still generally continue to behave as any other rational actor, just as did the UK at the height of its military power, and pursue relationships that are primarily in the interest of the state. The disagreements over Kyoto, steel tariffs, the International Criminal Court and ITAR testify to this.
While this may appear to fly in the face of the earlier assessment of British influence, this
is not the case. The US knows that it needs to develop relationships with other countries to enhance its own IOPs. The choice to be made is which countries will generate the greater return on the investment and how significant must that investment be in order to achieve state policy. America are together, the others will work with us. If we split, the rest will play around, play us off and nothing but mischief will be the result of it."
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Conclusion
The above analysis has explored the background to the relationship between the European Union and the United States, from the viewpoint of each power in turn, to demonstrate why many believe that 'it has gone sour'. 55 While the EU is changing fast, there appear to be polarized views on both sides of the Atlantic, the Americans regarding the Europeans as unable to respond to crises in a timely manner and with one voice, and the EU considering that the US is becoming increasingly unilateralist with particular regard to its foreign policy. However, with both sides now so interdependent on each other and sharing such common values and policies, as demonstrated by their security strategies, a continuing divergence in the relationship will be counterproductive at best, and in a world threatened by terror and mass destruction, catastrophic at worst.
Although the 2006 Munich conference on security policy showed some signs of reconciliation, there are still some 'counterweight' theorists within an EU where visions of transAtlantic harmony should reside. With a track record spanning decades of good relations with the US, it falls to the UK to foster an atmosphere of greater tolerance and understanding on both sides of the water to avoid the counterweight theory becoming a self fulfilling prophesy. 56 For British politicians, history has shown that while maintaining the 'special relationship' comes at a cost, both politically, as well as in human terms for the troops they commit to the battlefield, the benefits have resulted in considerable influence over the United States. The UK must continue to rise to not only this challenge, but also to improving US relations with Europe, and it is in its best interest to do so. A Europe that is closer to the US will also view the UK-US relationship with less animosity. In any future US-led conflict in the GWOT, it is likely that the UK will want to continue to show solidarity with its long-term partner and commit forces as before. As such, it is also likely that the UK will be pivotal in cementing that 'coalition of the willing', particularly within Europe. So if the UK is considered a respected member of the EU, and EU-US relations hopefully remain on a stronger footing, this task will be all the easier for Britain's prime minister.
Nonetheless, there are still those who believe that the UK does not have the capacity to hold the middle ground between the EU and the US, and must therefore chose allegiance to either of them, but not to both -an argument often based around the UK military's ability to integrate with the US, as well as with any future EU defense force. However, such beliefs do not stand up to scrutiny. Politically, on numerous occasions Prime Minister Blair has demonstrated his allegiance to the EU, such as during his presentation to Congress in July 2003 and in his determination to develop the European defense force. From his perspective, he sees the US as a nation that shares the same ideals as the UK and is willing to use force when required, as is the UK, but he also sees the UK as uniquely positioned to illustrate to the US the EU way of 'doing business.'
From a military perspective, the UK expends every effort minimizing the technological and doctrinal gaps between the UK and the US, and as such has attained interoperability with the US that exceeds that of any other country. With the UK at the forefront of EU defense force development, this will have a positive effect on European forces, which in all likelihood, will be required to integrate within US-led operations in the future. The UK's future position regarding its trans-Atlantic aspirations is best summed up by the Prime Minister himself:
"For Britain, for once the word "unique" is fitting. We have a unique role to play. Call it a bridge, a two lane motorway, a pivot or call it a damn high wire, which is how it often feels; our job is to keep our sights firmly on both sides of the Atlantic, use the good old British characteristics of common sense and make the argument. In doing so, we are not subverting our country either into an American poodle or a European municipality, we are advancing the British national interest in a changed world in the early 21st century. And yes, we should be optimistic and confident of [our] ability to do it." 57 With the UK's capacity and willingness to influence the US towards greater cooperation with the EU established, it is up to the US to take an inward look and determine if there is, in fact, any merit to the 'European Way of War' as endorsed by Geoff Hoon. 58 If, as Ronald Asmus states, "When the USA and the EU cooperate, they can set a global agenda," then surely with a little help from an intermediary such as the United Kingdom, this is in the realm of the possible. 59 
